Severson v. State Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 42830 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-3-2015
Severson v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42830
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Severson v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42830" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5519.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5519
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
COPY 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 














DOCKET NO. 42830 
Elmore Co. Case No. 
CV-2009-1408 
vs. 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ON REVIEW 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
In its brief filed in support of its petition for review, which the Court 
granted, the state raised two primary reasons this Court should grant review. 
Those reasons were summarized in the issues presented on review as: 
1. Is review proper because the Court of Appeals' conclusion 
that this Court's resolution of substantive issues under the rubric of 
fundamental error in Severson's direct appeal had no preclusive 
effect in relation to Severson's post-conviction claim that counsel 
was ineffective in relation to those same substantive issues is a 
question of substance not heretofore determined by this Court? 
2. Is review proper because the Court of Appeals, contrary to 
precedent from this Court, declined to consider whether summary 
dismissal was appropriate for the alternative reason that Severson 
1 
failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact in support of his 
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
prosecutor's closing argument? 
(Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, p.7.) 
In his response brief, Severson complains, in relevant part: "even though 
the state is apparently seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals' opinion in full, it 
has offered no argument or citation to authority to support this Court overruling 
Ticor[Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119,157 P.3d 613 (2007)] and establish a 
new test for issue preclusion." (Appellant's Brief on Review, p.9.) Severson then 
cites State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996), for the proposition 
that a party waives an issue if it fails to support it with argument or authority. 1 
(Appellant's Brief on Review, pp.9-10.) To the extent Severson perceives the 
state's request for review as including a request that this Court overrule Ticor, he 
is incorrect. Moreover, there is no need to overrule Ticor in order to resolve the 
issues raised on appeal. In fact, the principles stated in Ticor are likely pertinent 
to this Court's consideration of the issues presented in this case. 
In Ticor, this Court stated: 
Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves 
the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive 
disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice litigated 
to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in protecting 
the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it 
1 This argument, with its reliance on Zichko, misunderstands the scope of this 
Court's review. On review, this Court does not review the decision of the Court 
of Appeals but "reviews the district court's decision directly." State v. Lampien, 
148 Idaho 367, 371, 223 P.3d 750, 754 (2009). The state bears no burden of 
showing error by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, Severson, as the appellant, 
bears the burden of showing error by the district court. State v. Willoughby, 147 
Idaho 482, 488, 211 P.3d 91, 97 (2009). Severson cannot meet his burden of 
showing error by claiming the Respondent has not cited authority. 
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advances the private interest in repose from the harassment of 
repetitive claims. 
Ticor, 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at 617 (citations omitted). 
Consistent with the foregoing principles, this Court noted in State v. 
Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 10 n.1, 966 P.2d 10 n.1 (1998) (citations omitted): "[W]hen 
legal issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising them again in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding." It was this principle the state advanced in its Respondent's 
Brief. (Respondent's Brief, p.11.) With respect to this assertion, the Court of 
Appeals addressed the applicability of issue preclusion to Severson's post-
conviction claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to portions of the 
prosecutor's closing argument. (Opinion, p.9.) In doing so, the Court of Appeals 
recited the "five-element test for issue preclusion" as articulated by this Court in 
Ticor (Opinion, p.9 (quoting Ticor, 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618).) Contrary 
to Severson's suggestion otherwise, the state has never asserted this test is 
incorrect or should be overruled. (See generally Respondent's Brief in Support 
of Petition for Review.) The state's only assertion was that the Court of Appeals, 
in conducting its analysis, erred in deciding that "issues reviewed on direct 
appeal under fundamental error have no preclusive effect to related claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel raised in subsequent post-convictions 
proceedings." (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, p.10.) To 
the extent Severson understands the state's argument as something different, 
that understanding is incorrect. 
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Severson also contends that the state incorrectly claimed in its brief on 
review that this Court, on direct appeal, "rejected Severson's argument that 
[there] was an improper comment on Severson's Fifth Amendment right not to 
incriminate himself because it could be 'accorded other meanings."' 
(Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, p.9 (quoting State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215 P.3d 414, 439 (2009)) (cited in Appellant's 
Brief on Review, p.10.) Severson argues, "that is not what this Court held." 
(Appellant's Brief on Review, p.10.) In support of his argument, Severson notes 
this Court analyzed the challenged statement under the fundamental error 
standard and contends that the Court's conclusion that the statement did not 
amount to fundamental error presents a different issue than whether the 
statement was "objectionable misconduct." (Appellant's Brief on Review, pp.10-
11.) The state is, of course, aware that the Court's analysis of this statement on 
direct appeal was done pursuant to the fundamental error standard, but the state 
fails to appreciate why Severson finds this fact meaningful. If a statement is not 
error, it cannot be fundamental error. While the Court framed the issue in terms 
of fundamental error, the following statements made by the Court support the 
state's position that the Court rejected the assertion that the prosecutor's 
challenged comment did not result in a Fifth Amendment violation: 
Although the statement that "[t]his is a circumstantial case, 
because nobody was in that house that night but Mary and Larry. 
Nobody knows, that has testified, what happened between them" 
could be interpreted as a reference to Severson's failure to testify, 
it could also be accorded other meanings. For example, the 
comment could have been a reference to Dr. Groben's inability to 
conclusively establish Mary's cause of death. Because we will not 
accord the prosecutor's comment its most damaging meaning, we 
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are unwilling to conclude that the prosecutor was referencing 
Severson's silence. Nothing in the statement explicitly called for 
the jury to infer Severson was guilty because of his silence or to 
convict him on that basis. In all likelihood, given the ambiguous 
nature of the statement, the prosecutor did not even consider the 
interpretation Severson would attach to it. 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439. 
Even recognizing the different standard applicable to claims raised for the 
first time on appeal, the fundamental question presented to this Court remains 
the same: do the principles of res judicata apply differently to claims considered 
on direct appeal pursuant to the fundamental error doctrine as opposed to claims 
considered pursuant to an objection? If the answer to that question is no, then 
any issue that was decided as part of the Court's resolution of the three closing 
argument claims raised for the first time on appeal could not be relitigated under 
the guise of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
With respect to the second issue raised on appeal (and on review) -
whether the district court's summary dismissal should have been affirmed based 
on Severson's failure to allege a genuine issue of material fact - Severson 
"presum[es]" that "the state is claiming that to survive a summary judgment 
motion, [he] needed to present evidence from his prior counsel that their decision 
to not object was a reasonable tactical decision" and then asserts "[t]his 
argument is ... contrary to this Court's and the Court of Appeals' precedent." 
(Appellant's Brief on Review, p.14.) The state, however, made no such 
argument. What the state did assert, and what is well-established, is that 
"Whatever [counsel's] explanation [for not objecting], Strickland requires [the 
Court] to 'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the 
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wide range of reasonable professional assistance."' (Respondent's Brief in 
Support of Petition for Review, p.12 (quoting United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 
1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 
(1984)).) With respect to this standard, the state submitted that Severson failed 
to allege a genuine issue of material fact that counsel's performance was 
deficient. (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, p.12.) The 
remainder of the state's position on this point will not be repeated here. (See 
Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, p.12.) 
The state will also not repeat its position regarding Severson's failure to 
allege a genuine issue of material fact with respect to prejudice. (See 
Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.12-14.) That Severson 
believes the evidence against him was not compelling (contrary to this Court's 
observation that "there was substantial and competent evidence to support the 
jury's conclusion that Severson was guilty of first-degree murder," Severson, 147 
Idaho at 715, 215 P.3d at 435), does not mean he raised a genuine issue of 
material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on the question of prejudice. 
(Appellant's Brief on Review, pp.16-17.) Indeed, the state fails to comprehend 
what evidence Severson would present at an evidentiary hearing on the issue of 
prejudice. The only "evidence" of prejudice Severson cited in his petition was the 
dissenting opinion on direct appeal. (R., p.70.) Severson relies on that 
allegation "combined with the transcripts of the trial which were submitted in 
support of [his] petition" as sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact for 
an evidentiary hearing. (Appellant's Brief on Review, p.16.) Review of te dissent 
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and the trial transcripts does not require an evidentiary hearing. The district 
court could have summarily dismissed this claim based on Severson's failure to 
allege a genuine issue of material fact necessitating an evidentiary hearing and, 
as such, this Court can affirm the summary dismissal order on this basis. 
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,807,839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order dismissing Severson's post-conviction petition. 
DATED this 3rd day of April 2015. 
JE,S9ICA M. LORELLO 
D~l'.lty Attorney General 
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